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Abstract
Over the past decade, Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS) have improved steadily in the efficiency and 
effectiveness with which they detect intrusive activity. This 
is particularly true with signature-based IDS due to 
progress with intrusion analysis and intrusion signature 
specification. At the same time system complexity, overall 
numbers of bugs and security vulnerabilities have been on 
the increase. This has led to the recognition that in order 
to operate over the entire attack space, multiple 
heterogeneous IDS must be used, which need to 
interoperate with one another, and possibly also with 
other components of system security. This paper describes 
our research into developing algorithms for attack 
signature matching for detecting multi-stage attacks 
manifested by alerts from heterogeneous IDS. It describes 
also the testing and preliminary results of that research, 
and the administrator interface used to analyze the alerts 
produced by the tests and the results of signature 
matching.   
1. Introduction - Related Work and 
Motivation 
  Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have evolved 
significantly over the past two decades since their 
inception in the early 1980s [1]. The simple IDS of the 
early days were based either upon the use of simple rule–
based logic to detect very specific patterns of intrusive 
behaviour or upon historical activity profiles to confirm 
legitimate behaviour. In contrast, we now have IDS which 
use data-mining and machine-learning techniques [2] for 
the dynamic compilation of new intrusion signatures and 
which allow for quite general expressions of what may 
constitute intrusive behaviour. Other modern IDS may use  
a mixture of sophisticated statistical and forecasting 
techniques to predict what is legitimate activity.  
Alert correlation is one of the central issues currently 
challenging intrusion detection research. Recent work by 
Morin et al [3] provides a formal model - M2D2 - for 
alarm or alert correlation. The M2D2 model comes at a 
time when researchers and implementers are grappling 
with the need for reduction of the number of false 
positives, and indeed that is one of the focal points 
emphasised in the paper by Morin et al. Our work is 
related to previous work by Vigna et. al. [4], Doyle et. al. 
[5], Valdes and Skinner [6], Cuppens [7] and Debar and 
Wespi [8]. None of this work, including ours, attempts to 
incorporate the four dimensions of M2D2.  
The work by Vigna et. al. uses the STAT model to 
provide a framework for dynamic configurability of IDS 
sensors and uses Java to aid in portability. The work by 
Doyle et. al. with MAITA reflects similar goals, but 
utilises a more complex architecture to support 
interoperability and uses trend templates for the 
specification of chains of events as opposed to the STATL 
attack scenario language used in the STAT work. Valdes 
and Skinner use a probabilistic approach to perform 
correlation of information from multiple sensors, and 
focus on the concept of ‘threads’ to maintain links 
between alerts. Debar and Wespi [8] use features in the 
Tivoli Enterprise Console to perform aggregation and 
correlation of alerts, and focus on the abilities of a 
management system to reduce the amount of data 
presented to an administrator. Recent work by Cuppens 
([7], [9]) which focuses on commodity IDS, and uses a 
central database for alert aggregation and analysis is the 
most similar to our own approach. Cuppens uses a Prolog 
database and static signatures for attack detection, together 
with stored procedures to perform aggregation of alerts to 
reduce redundancy. The signature set is defined using the 
LAMBDA syntax, which enables the specification of very 
complex event relationships.  
While each of these systems has its own special 
objectives, they have in common that in each case use is 
made of a central alert store that captures alerts from 
multiple sensors in order to assist the overall intrusion 
detection process. Some of the systems use IDMEF for 
communication, and some utilise purpose built IDS 
platforms, rather than relying on commodity IDS for alert 
data. While all perform some sort of analysis on the data, 
the analysis mechanisms used are different.  
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Our work too is pitched at the correlation of alerts 
emanating from heterogeneous IDS using a central alert 
store that captures alerts from multiple sensors [10]. In 
contrast however, it adopts a bottom up approach to the 
problem and sets out to develop a simple framework built 
out of commodity and free software in order to produce 
practical alert correlation across heterogenous commodity 
IDS. There are some other, more minor, differences too 
with regard to implementation, such as not using stored 
procedures, the nature of the interaction between alert 
correlation and signatures, and the relatively simple format 
and implementation of the multi-step attack signatures 
themselves. The two major goals of our work have been to 
design and implement:  
1. signature-based attack detection which matches 
attack signatures with an alert stream comprising 
alerts from heterogeneous IDS and uses off the shelf 
software and a minimum of specialised components 
to do so, and 
2. an experimental platform to allow experimentation 
with new signature matching algorithms and 
mechanisms. 
To achieve these goals, the work has involved the 
development of an alert or cluster analysis capability to 
facilitate the analysis and correlation of alerts from 
heterogeneous IDS, and a visualization capability to 
complement and assist the alert analysis capability and to 
facilitate signature discovery.  The alert or cluster 
analysis was discussed in our paper [10], the visualization 
features are new.  
Interoperability is a crucial part of alert analysis, 
providing a common platform for alerts arriving from 
heterogeneous IDS and possibly other system security 
components such as firewalls and host logs. We employ 
IDMEF for this purpose and this allows us to exploit the 
use of heterogeneous IDS to provide identification and 
notification of a wider range of alerts than is possible with 
homogeneous IDS and thus perform cross-sensor 
signature-based attack detection.  
While the ultimate goal of IDS and inter-IDS alert 
correlation is to provide real-time warning or even 
reaction to perceived alerts and attacks, there are 
outstanding issues to be solved relating to IDS 
interoperability and attack recognition which are most 
easily and productively tackled in an offline or post hoc 
context. Our focus has therefore been on the development 
of an offline platform for studying attack signature 
matching and discovery techniques. This enables us to 
concentrate on experimentation with signature 
specification and matching techniques and avoid being 
distracted unnecessarily by real-time performance 
considerations.  For the future, this will enable us to study 
outcomes such as how the error rate of false negatives and 
false positives varies with circumstances.   
The system also includes a security administrator 
interface with access to both the signature detection  and 
the alert analysis and visualization functions. The interface 
also provides access to a number of system configuration 
parameters thus providing the basis for studying the 
different outcomes (e.g., error rates) resulting from 
different experimental scenarios. 
The paper is structured as follows. This section has 
reviewed related work, including the authors’ previous 
work upon which the work described here is founded, and 
provides also the rationale for the work described in the 
paper.  Section 2 examines the detailed design of our 
attack signature specification and the detection algorithms 
we have developed.  Section 3 discusses an example of a 
specific attack signature that illustrates our approach while 
Section 4 describes the administrator interface which 
provides access to both the signature detection and alert 
analysis capabilities of our system, together with 
visualization features. Section 5 on Testing and Evaluation 
discusses the attack set used to test and evaluate our 
system and presents the preliminary results achieved with 
respect to that attack set. This is followed by the 
conclusions and summary of further work in Section 6.  
2. Signature Specification and Matching - 
Detailed Design 
Our earlier paper [10] focused on IDS interoperability, 
system architecture and alert cluster analysis, the 
subsequent work described in this paper relates to the 
signature specification and matching techniques that we 
have developed and details of these appear immediately 
below.   
2.1. Signature Specification 
The correlation of alerts whether from the one IDS over 
time or across several heterogeneous IDS provides two 
significant benefits: 
 signature-based attack detection - it allows known 
multi-step attacks to be detected by matching alert 
streams against the set of known attack signatures, 
and 
 attack and signature discovery - it allows for the 
discovery of new attacks by identifying hitherto 
unseen alert relationships, and the discovery and 
incorporation of new attack signatures into the set of 
known attack signatures. 
The alert correlation work most closely related to ours 
is that by Cuppens and Miege [7], their work is however 
more ambitious than ours and has somewhat different 
objectives. It uses a sophisticated model based around first 
order logic for expressing signatures for attacks and for 
representing alerts, and has the ultimate objective of 
anticipating the future steps of an attacker. The signature 
set is defined using the LAMBDA syntax, which enables 
the specification of very complex event inter-relationships.  
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Our goal of producing a simple yet functional system 
for use in the context of heterogeneous IDS flows through 
into the specification and usage of signatures themselves. 
Attack specification languages such as LAMBDA [11] and 
CISL and S-expressions [12] provide the ability to define 
very complex relationships between events themselves.  
However they do not satisfy the goal of a simple 
method of specification. We on the other hand set out 
simply to recognize known multi-step attacks from an alert 
stream containing alerts from heterogeneous IDS, and to 
be able to learn new attacks to include into the signature 
set and to do both of these with simple, off-the-shelf 
components. The signature specification notation has thus 
been kept intentionally minimal.  
Our attack signatures are couched in terms of alert 
elements which consist of the following two alert 
characteristics:
1. alert name (the unique name of the alert), and 
2. alert time (the time the alert was detected). 
In addition, we include with each alert element some 
additional attributes as follows:  
3. timeout (inter-alert timeout) – this allows the expiry 
of signature (and hence attack) matching based upon 
expiry of the expected maximum time between 
successive alerts, 
4. optional/mandatory components - the alerts 
specified within an attack signature are by  default 
mandatory, and the absence of a mandatory alert 
within the timeout period will flag absence of the 
attack and expire the matching activity. An alert 
may however be marked as optional, and absence 
of an optional alert will not of itself lead to the 
conclusion that the attack is absent. An optional 
alert has an alert weight associated with it and a 
necessary condition for the signature to fire (i.e., for 
the signature as a whole to have been matched by 
alerts from the alert stream, thus signifying that an 
attack has been detected) is that the sum of the 
weights of matched optional alerts equals or exceeds 
a specified optional alert weight threshold 
associated with the signature.  
5. alert repeat factor - signatures include the facility 
for associating an alert repeat factor with an alert 
element, this is the threshold number of repeats 
(default of one) that needs to be achieved for an 
alert to satisfy the alert element. This does not affect 
the semantics of alert element weights.  
The signatures themselves have five attributes that are 
pivotal to the signature specification and matching 
algorithm:  
i. IP mask – this is the network mask (denoted by a 
number of bits) which determines a valid set of 
targets for this particular signature,  
ii. signature priority - the signature priority governs 
the order in which alerts are matched against 
candidate attack signatures. Given the use of 
‘single-fit’ of an alert from the alert stream to 
candidate signatures (see below), the priority order 
in which candidate signatures are matched against 
the alert stream is critical;  
iii. overall signature timeout – this allows the expiry of 
signature (and hence attack) matching based upon 
expiry of the total expected maximum time for an 
attack to complete (to be effective this must be less 
than the sum of the previously mentioned individual 
alert timeouts),  
iv. threshold weight – this is the threshold proportion 
of optional alerts (see below) that needs to be 
satisfied for the signature match to have been be 
deemed successful and the signature to have fired.  
This is achieved by associating a weight with each 
optional alert forming part of the signature and 
setting a minimum total or threshold weight that 
needs to be satisfied; and  
v. action on firing – typically this includes noting to 
the administrator’s console that the signature has 
fired and may include re-insertion of a named 
synthetic alert into the alert stream.  
Optional elements of an Attack Signature refer to an 
alert which does not necessarily have to be matched for 
that signature to fire (in contrast to mandatory alert 
elements). Such elements have an associated weighting. 
When such an optional alert element is matched, then its 
weighting is accumulated into the 
‘optional_alert_accumulated_weight’ (initially zero) for 
that active signature. For a signature to fire, all mandatory 
alert elements must have been matched, and the value of 
its ‘optional_alert_accumulated_weight’ must equal or 
exceed the threshold firing weight. The latter has a default 
of zero, which assumes that the signature contains no 
optional alert elements. Arbitrary threshold and element 
values enable the specification of situations such as ‘two 
out of three alerts’ or ‘alert xxxx plus three other alerts’.  
Note that the mandatory/optional, repeat factor and 
inter-alert timeouts are all optional for a signature. For 
ease of use, a signature can be initially specified with only 
the signature name, basic timeout, and using a group 
signature in order to provide a simple method of selecting 
all of the component alerts within a given time period.  
2.2. Signature Composition 
An attack signature may be one of two basic types:  
 a sequence of alerts, or  
 ҏҏa group of alerts.  
An attack signature consisting of an alert sequence is 
constructed as an ordered list, so that the signature is 
matched or fired when the final and all previous 
mandatory alert elements are satisfied in the order listed 
and when the threshold weight of optional alerts has been 
reached. An attack signature consisting of an alert group is 
constructed as a set such that the signature is matched or 
Proceedings of the 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2003) 
1063-9527/03 $17.00 © 2003 IEEE
fired when all the alert element items are matched, 
irrespective of order, and when the threshold weight of 
optional alerts has been reached. More complex attack 
signatures are composed by combining these two basic 
types of signatures by the concept of synthetic alerts, a 
concept which appears elsewhere in previous works (e.g., 
Cuppens [7]). When a basic attack signature type is fired, 
it can have two outcomes:  
 ҏҏnotification of the occurrence of an attack, and/or  
 ҏҏinsertion of a synthetic alert into the alert stream.  
Such a synthetic alert may itself then be matched with 
higher order signatures allowing the security administrator 
to construct attack signatures of arbitrary complexity.  
2.3. Signature Matching Algorithm  
Before considering the more significant design details 
of our signature-matching algorithm, we present the 
following definitions:  
 the active signature set - this is the set of all 
partially matched signatures, it is the set of all 
those signatures which have matched at least one 
alert and not yet timed out or completed. 
 the open signature set - this is initialised at start 
up to be the set of all attack signatures, it then 
grows to include the active signature set  
 the candidate alert set - this is the set of alerts 
comprised of:  
i. the first unmatched mandatory alert plus 
every immediately preceding unmatched 
optional alert in the case of a sequence 
signature, for all sequence signatures in 
the open signature set; and 
ii. every unmatched alert in the group in 
the case of a group signature, for all 
group signatures in the open signature 
set
 the per-alert candidate signature list - this is the 
priority-ordered list of open signatures ‘waiting’ 
for the alert. Signatures will typically appear in 
several such lists:  
- in the case of sequence signatures, the 
signature will appear in the signature list 
for its next unmatched mandatory alert, 
and in the signature lists of each 
unmatched optional alert preceding its 
next unmatched mandatory alert  
- in the case of a group alert, the signature 
will appear in the signature list for each 
of its unmatched alerts  
We now consider the details of our signature-matching 
algorithm.  
2.3.1 Single-fit Signature-matching We have 
implemented a ‘single-fit’ strategy for our matching 
algorithm, as opposed to a ‘multi-fit’ strategy. With a 
single-fit strategy of matching alerts to signatures, the 
current alert from the alert stream is matched against the 
candidate signature list associated with that alert, in 
particular with the first signature in the list i.e., the highest 
priority signature in the list, and this signature then 
‘consumes’ that alert. ‘Multi-fit’ on the other hand allows 
the current alert to contribute provisionally to multiple 
eligible signatures simultaneously until the first of these 
fires. At that time, the alert’s contribution to the other 
signatures is withdrawn and they are rolled back to their 
previous status.  This roll-back allows multiple threads of 
execution to run in parallel without affecting any other 
thread. 
Multi-fit has some advantages, the main one being that 
it leaves open the possibility of matches with all possible 
signatures until one fires and does so without necessarily 
burdening the administrator with details of signature 
priority (though priority may still be used). At the same 
time it has the disadvantage of increasing the complexity 
of the matching algorithm, where multiple roll-back 
strategies may be required to produce a ‘best-fit’ for a 
given stream of alerts.  
We have opted to use the single-fit algorithm and 
repeated experiments (given ours is currently an off-line 
platform) to perform this role, rather than focus on the 
algorithm for matching in exhaustive detail.  
Successive experiments have enabled us to adjust the 
relative priority ordering of signatures used in the single-
fit matching process and thus identify the alternative 
signature matching outcomes that can result with different 
signature priorities or ordering of alerts in the alert stream. 
Single-fit has also enabled direct analysis on how basic 
pattern matching is insufficient to describe the 
relationships between alerts in complex attacks when 
attack state, multiple attacks, alert overlap and out-of-
sequence alerts are considered. 
As single fit is, at it’s heart, basic sequential pattern 
matching, additional logic needed to be developed to 
enable the specification of priority, mandatory/optional, 
weighting and IP address filtering. These features were 
considered required functions to properly describe many 
of the attacks that can occur over the network. Indeed, this 
area of analysis of state-based attack detection 
mechanisms is considered an undeveloped area in IDS 
research. Implementation of a multi-fit strategy and 
comparisons between it and the single fit algorithm in 
practice is considered for future work.  
2.3.2 Duplicate Attacks Our system detects overlapped, 
duplicated attacks of the one identical type as the open 
signature set is initialised at start up to include all attack 
signatures and this is augmented with additional partially 
matched signatures as and when a new partial match 
occurs. This feature is configurable at set up time to be 
switched on or off for the purposes of experimentation and 
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so that it is possible for the administrator to forego the 
feature if desired. In some cases, detecting overlapped 
identical attacks is not necessarily more valuable than 
detecting just the one instance of the attack.  
2.3.3 Slow Attacks, Timeouts and Alert Propagation 
The system prevents knowledge of the timeouts used by 
signatures from being exploited by an attacker. That is, an 
attacker could attempt to subvert the system essentially by 
launching a slow attack or a number of such attacks. We 
guard against this situation by deploying two 
countermeasures:  
 detection of overlapped, duplicate attacks - the 
first is the configurable detection of overlapped, 
duplicate attacks as discussed above,  
 alert propagation - the second is our treatment of 
signature priority and the propagation of alerts 
between signatures. As mentioned previously, 
matching of the current alert to the open signature 
set takes place through the candidate signature 
list for that alert. There is a configurable option 
for that candidate signature list to include not just 
the bona fide candidate signatures for that alert, 
let us call it alertcurrent, but also all those active 
signatures that have recently matched an earlier 
duplicate of the same alert, say alertprevious. Any 
active signature, whose most recent previous alert 
match had been to such a duplicate alertprevious,
will also appear in the candidate alert list.  
The significance of the last point is that a signature that 
had previously matched alertprevious, is now expecting a 
completely different alert different-alert, but is about to 
time out due to expiry of the inter-alert time out 
mechanism will be refreshed with the new alert alertcurrent,
that is the new alert alertcurrent will replace the previous 
older one alerttprevious, thus preventing a possible signature 
time out. This of course may retrospectively contradict the 
previous inter-alert time out constraint but has the benefit 
of guarding against detection avoidance through 
manipulation of signature time out. The replaced alert is 
then propagated to the next candidate signature in the list 
and the process continues recursively. Since the list is 
ordered by signature priority, we ensure that the highest 
priority open signatures are given maximum chance of 
firing. The three factors which govern how alerts are 
matched against signatures are, in order:  
1. the alert type,  
2. the priority order of the signatures in the 
candidate signature list, and  
3. IP masking constraints associated with the alert 
element.  
3. Signature Specification and Matching  – An 
Example 
We provide here an example of an attack signature in 
order to demonstrate our approach. This example is used 
in the experiments described in Section 5. This particular 
attack is the same as the one used in work by Cuppens [7]. 
In fact, this particular attack requires four separate 
signatures. Three of these signatures generate synthetic 
alerts, as described above, which are matched by the 
fourth signature.  
FINGER root
query [FINGER:ROOT]
Cuppens Finger Detect
RPC portmap
listing
RPC portmap
request mountd DYNAMIC-TCP
Cuppens RPC Detect
RSERVICES
rlogin root [RSH:ROOT]
Cuppens Remote Login Detect
Cuppens Finger
Detect
Cuppens RPC
Detect
Cuppens Remote
Login Detect Cuppens 3 Stage Detect
Figure 1: Cuppens Attack Signature 
The two IDS used in our experiments, Snort and 
Dragon, produce different alerts when detecting this 
attack. These alerts can be related to each other based on 
their content. Snort produces the following specific pattern 
of alerts:  
 FINGER root query;
 ҏҏtwo occurrences of RPC portmap listing;
 RPC portmap request mountd; and  
 ҏRSERVICES rlogin root.
While Dragon produces the following alerts:  
 FINGER:ROOT;
 three DYNAMIC-TCP alerts; and  
 a RSH:ROOT alert.
Figure 1 shows the structure of each of the four 
signatures used in detecting this attack. The “FINGER 
root” alert generated by Snort and the “FINGER:ROOT” 
alert generated by Dragon are equivalent. These alerts are 
grouped in the first signature, which we label “CUPPENS 
Finger Detect”. The second signature, labelled 
“CUPPENS RPC Detect”, is made up of the “RPC 
portmap listing” and “RPC portmap request mountd” 
alerts generated by Snort and also includes the 
“DYNAMIC-TCP” alert generated by Dragon. Multiple 
instances of the “RPC portmap listing” and “DYNAMIC-
TCP” alerts are detected by setting the alert repeat factor 
to a value greater than one. The “RSERVICES rlogin 
root” (Snort) and “RSH:ROOT” (Dragon) together form 
the third signature, labelled “CUPPENS Remote Login 
Detect”. Finally, the fourth signature, which represents the 
entire Cuppens attack, is comprised of the first three 
synthetic alerts. 
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In this particular case, the format of the entry in the file 
used to store signatures is in the form of four signatures, 
shown here in basic form (no individual alert replication, 
timing or weighting information) using a comma-
delimited format: 
1. CuppenFinger, group, newalert, CUPPENS 
Finger Detect, 32, 5, 0, 2, FINGER root query, 
[FINGER:ROOT] 
2. CuppenRemoteLogin, sequence, newalert, 
CUPPENS Remote Login Detect, 32, 20, 0, 2, 
RSERVICES rlogin root, [RSH:ROOT] 
3. CuppenRPC, group, newalert, CUPPENS RPC 
Detect, 32, 30, 0, 3, RPC portmap listing, RPC 
portmap request mountd, [DYNAMIC-TCP] 
4. Cuppen3Stage, sequence, newalert, CUPPENS 
3 Stage Detect, 32, 20, 0, 3, CUPPENS Finger 
Detect, CUPPENS RPC Detect, CUPPENS 
Remote Login Detect 
We note for the purposes of illustration using the 
first signature as an example, that CuppenFinger, is a 
group signature spawning a ‘new alert’ of ‘CUPPENS 
Finger Detect’, it has a netmask of 32, a timeout of 5 
seconds, a weighting threshold of zero (i.e. not used) 
and a priority of 2 out of 5, with 1 being the highest. 
The first three signatures above correspond to the 
first three signatures  in Figure 1(the top two signatures, 
and the middle signature), and the fourth corresponds to  
the bottom signature in Figure 1 which combines the 
first three signature synthetic alerts into a second-level 
signature.  This is achieved by using the alerts produced 
by the ‘new alert’ option in each of the first three 
signatures.  
4. The Administrator Interface 
The administrator interface (Figure 2) provides the 
security administrator with access to both the signature 
detection and alert visualization and analysis functions.  
Figure 2: Administrator Interface Screenshot 
The Administrator Interface was developed to provide 
an interface to the following features:  
1. signature-based attack detection - execute signature-
based attack detection on the alert stream from the 
database with options:  
 display the list of signatures that fired, and  
 display the list of signatures that expired before 
firing  
2. an experimental platform to allow experimentation 
with new signature matching algorithms and 
mechanisms viz., a system configuration capability 
to configure a number of system parameters 
including signature priorities, duplicate attack 
detection, alert propagation  
3. an alert or cluster analysis capability to facilitate 
the analysis and correlation of alerts from 
heterogeneous IDS  
4. a visualization capability to complement and 
facilitate the above alert analysis capability in order 
to facilitate signature discovery; in particular to 
provide a summary graphing analysis of alerts with 
information on IDS, time, and alert name, and 
provide access to detailed information across a 
range of attributes down to the individual alert level. 
Feature 1 provides a display of the outcome of the attack 
signature detection that was discussed earlier in Section 2 
(right panel in Figure 2). This lists the names of the attacks 
that were detected and in each case allows the 
administrator to display the signature itself and the 
particular alerts that contributed to it. It also displays 
‘incomplete’ attacks and is included in order to assist the 
administrator in developing better or more complete attack 
signatures for inclusion in the attack signature set. Feature 
2 has been discussed in earlier sections of the paper. 
Feature 3, together with our architecture for 
interoperability, is discussed in our earlier paper [10]. 
We focus now on the remaining feature, feature 4, the 
provision of visualization and summary graphing 
information with access to detailed alert information (this 
can be seen in the left side of Figure 2). The intention of 
this feature is to provide the security administrator with 
the opportunity to examine alert traffic in general with a 
view to identifying unexpected traffic not diagnosed by 
the signature detection and to identify and evolve new 
attack signatures for inclusion in the attack signature set. 
The display presents the following information:  
 time (x-axis),  
 ҏҏsensor (icon),  
 ҏҏalert type (top graph, y-axis), and 
 alert number (bottom graph, y-axis).  
This information is presented in two co-located graphs, 
one showing alert type, sensor and time (the upper graph), 
and the other showing the numbers of alerts within the 
discrete time periods (the lower graph). Placing the mouse 
over an item in the upper graph shows the specific name, 
IDS and time of the alert(s) that are indicated. Clicking on 
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the item brings up detailed alert information. The lower 
graph uses a logarithmic scale on the y-axis. The display 
becomes particularly useful when a DoS or IDS 
overloading attack occurs, as it allows the administrator to 
see patterns in the alert data, and elements within the 
graph can be clicked on to gather information about the 
alerts which correspond to each item in the graph. 
Visualization of the relationship between signatures and 
surrounding alerts is also particularly useful.  
When looking at the alerts that are attributed to a 
signature, it is possible to view the other alerts that have 
occurred at about the same time, and a graph can show this 
information over a large time period, without becoming 
overly complex.  
There are certain attacks that cannot currently be 
specified in our signatures, while they can be observed in 
the graphs provided. The graphing functionality can be 
used to identify trends and series of alerts that do not 
correspond to signatures. For example, if a large number 
of alerts is observed on a single host, one might assume 
that an attack is taking place. By clicking on individual 
items in the upper graph, the administrator can drill down 
and see the alerts within that item, and look at the features 
of those alerts. Certain attacks such as DoS or IDS alert 
spoofing attacks can be observed visually by looking at the 
amount, type and IDS of alerts that have been stored.  
The general advantage of the prototype GUI over other 
approaches is that the user is never confronted with any 
sort of flat text file containing alerts. Alerts are shown 
either in the graphs provided (where the user can identify 
each alert type by the legend at the bottom of the screen) 
or by investigation of the alerts that have been matched to 
signatures. Alerts with high occurrences as well as those 
with low occurrences are easily identified and can be 
investigated by clicking on the graph. The graph also 
identifies which alerts are produced by which sensor, 
which is useful for tracking trends either of attacks moving 
within the network, attacks that are only detected by a 
particular IDS, or alerts that may constitute false alarms. 
In practice, this makes the identification and analysis of 
alert streams with large numbers of alerts much quicker 
than some other approaches. 
5. Testing and Evaluation 
In order to properly gauge the usefulness of our system, 
we experimented with various attacks and profiled the 
operation of our system on a set of attack data.  The testing 
procedure was developed both to test the operation of the 
system itself, and to evaluate the success of the 
methodology with regard to attack detection outcomes. 
This entailed the construction of a test network consisting 
of two ‘client’ machines, each hosting Snort and Dragon 
NIDS. The alerts from these systems are then interpreted 
by IDS Alert Agents, and sent to the Control Unit on a 
separate third machine. The Control Unit is co-located 
with a PostgreSQL Alert Database on a third host, and 
stores all alerts received in the database. This is then 
accessed from a separate fourth machine acting as the 
Administrative Console. The machines were placed on a 
switch, to separate traffic into distinct network segments. 
5.1. Attack Detection Outcomes  
In order to test the prototype, a suite of attacks with 
different characteristics was selected. The attacks utilised 
a number of different attack tools: two DoS-type tools, 
stick and tfn2k, the port-scanner nmap, the vulnerability 
scanner Vetescan, and two exploit tools which attack 
network management protocols. Four distinct attacks were 
run:   
Attack 1. A simple nmap stealth scan, with two phases: 
one with nmap running alone, and one running with the 
IDS alert spoofing tool stick run at the same time to 
obfuscate the nmap alerts. 
Attack 2. This attack consists of running Vetescan and the 
two exploit tools on both hosts. 
Attack 3. The Cuppens attack [7], which consists of 6 
steps, of which only five (all except step 5) are detectable 
by Snort and Dragon:  
1. finger root@target  
2. rcpinfo <target>  
3. showmount <target>  
4. mount <target directory>  
5. cat “++” < .rhost  
6. rlogin <target> 
Attack 4. An attack using the DoS tool tfn2k, first against 
one host, and then against both hosts, in order to determine 
the difference in amounts of alerts, if any.  
The attacks were scripted in order to satisfy 
reproducibility concerns, and the session was logged using 
TCPDUMP for later analysis. Using scripting meant that 
the attacks could be performed quickly and were 
repeatable for multiple iterations if required.  
The attacks were run in four different scenarios: 
sequentially; sequentially with background traffic; 
simultaneously; and simultaneously with background 
traffic. These scenarios enabled us to test the performance 
of the detection algorithms in very different 
circumstances, with differing levels of alert dispersion and 
intensity. The background traffic was injected onto the 
network while the attacks were running. This was 
achieved using the TCPREPLAY utility, in order to make 
the testing process reproducible.  
As shown in Table 1, in all except two instances, each 
of the attacks was detectable using our signature-based 
attack detection approach. Attack 2 was not detected in 
either of the cases where the attacks were run 
simultaneously. This was because higher priority alerts, 
such as those resulting from Attacks 1 and 3, have priority 
over the alerts that the Attack 2 signature required. The 
original alerts were not propagated by the detection engine 
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due to the exploit signature either not being active (and 
therefore not acknowledging the need for that alert), the 
exploit signature timing out before the alert could be 
reassigned, or the alert giving rise to a new instantiation of 
the higher priority signatures as they were needed for a 
group signature. However, the signatures could be 
matched if the priority for Attack 2 was increased to be 
higher than Attacks 1 and 3.  
Table 1: Summary of results for each scenario 
tested 
Signature 
TCP-
Scan
Exploit Cuppens 
DoS 
Attack 
Sequential Detect Detect Detect Detect 
Sequential 
w/background 
Detect Detect Detect Detect 
Simultaneous Detect Detect
* Detect Detect 
Simultaneous 
w/background 
Detect Detect* Detect Detect 
* This was not detected when run normally. This attack 
was only detected when its signature was rated at a higher 
priority than TCP-Scan and Cuppens (not the case by 
default in testing). 
We also performed experiments to determine the effect 
of different signature parameters on the matching 
operation. The results of those experiments are presented 
in the following sections.  
5.2. Other Test Results 
5.2.1. Mandatory/Optional/Weighting As described in 
Section 2.1, an alert appearing in a signature can be tagged 
as optional, in which case it is tagged also with an 
associated weight.  In the absence of optional alerts, a 
signature will fire – assuming no timeouts have occurred - 
when all its (mandatory) alerts have been matched by the 
alert stream.  With optional alerts, it is possible to 
construct signatures whose firing depends not only upon 
the matching of the regular or mandatory alerts forming 
part of the signature, but also upon the matching of a 
sufficient sub-set of optional alerts.   This is achieved by 
specifying a signature threshold for the cumulative 
optional alert weight and specifying individual alert 
weights for each optional alert.  Note that only the first 
alert of the type contributes to the cumulative optional 
alert weight.  We performed the following experiments 
varying the threshold weight to test the performance of 
this feature.  
The Attack 1 (TCP-Scan) signature consists of three 
alerts in a group, “TCP-SCAN”, “Scan Proxy (8080)” and 
“ICMP Ping NMAP”. It is illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
ICMP Ping NMAP SCAN Proxy(8080) TCP-SCAN
TCPScan
Figure 3: Attack 1 (TCP-Scan) Signature 
Attack 1 can be specified as a ‘2 out of 3’ example, 
where if two of the signature’s alerts are detected, the 
TCP-Scan signature should be fired. This can be 
accomplished by setting each item to optional and each 
alert’s weighting to be 1, with a threshold of 2. Table 2 
gives the results of experiments relating to modifying the 
threshold value for optional alerts.  (The attack resulted in 
6 TCP-SCAN, 3 SCAN PROXY and 2 ICMP PING 
NMAP alerts). 
The testing consisted of four cases: 
Case 1. All Mandatory – Testing how many times the 
signature will match when requiring all alerts. 
Case 2. All Optional, Threshold 1 – Testing how the 
signature will match when 1 out of 3 is required. 
Case 3. All Optional, Threshold 2 – Testing how the 
signature will match when 2 out of 3 is required. 
Case 4. All Optional, Threshold 3 – Testing how the 
signature will match when 3 out of 3 is required 
(effectively  identical to Case 1). 
The number of expected and actual matches for each 
case is listed in Table 2.   
Table 2. Number of alerts generated for different 
threshold weights (M-Mandatory, O-Optional) 
Case 1 2 3 4
Threshold 
Weight
N/A 1 2 3 
TCP-SCAN M O O O 
SCAN Proxy 
(8080) 
M O O O 
ICMP PING 
NMAP
M O O O 
# of expected 
matches 
2 11 5 2 
# of actual 
matches 
2 11 4* 2 
* An out-of-sequence alert affected this result, meaning 
practical results did not meet theoretical expectations.
This feature should be useful in specifying random 
attacks such as spoofing attacks, portions of DoS attacks 
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or even scanning activity. 
5.2.2. Alert Repeat Factor The alert repeat factor is 
useful for signatures designed to detect attacks which 
consist of multiple instances of the same alert. A good 
example of such an attack is a denial of service attack, 
such as our Attack 4. 
 Attack 4, being a DoS attack, has a large number of 
alerts normally associated with it, however the alerts that 
appear are of three types, shown in Figure 4. 
TCP-SCAN BAD TRAFFIC 0ttl
BAD TRAFFIC
loopback traffic
DosAttack
Figure 4: Attack 4 (DosAttack) 
If a signature was used that required only a single 
instance of each of these alerts, it would fire tens of times 
per second. The alert repeat factor is provided in order to 
allow an administrator to better configure how the system 
responds to these sorts of attacks.   
With a well-tuned alert repeat factor, the number of 
times a signature matching occurs can be reduced. Table 3 
shows the relative numbers of the three different alerts 
within our simultaneous scenario. 
Table 3. Results for various alert repeat factors 
for Attack 4 
Total 
Alerts
Start
Time
End Time
TCP-SCAN 6 3:52:56 3:53:27 
BAD TRAFFIC 
0 ttl 
4895 3:52:55 3:53:17 
BAD TRAFFIC 
loopback traffic 
67 3:52:55 3:53:16 
Total 4968 3:52:55 3:53:27 
It should be noted that the distribution of these alerts can 
vary significantly, with the “BAD TRAFFIC 0 ttl” alert on 
average occurring 73 times more than the “BAD 
TRAFFIC loopback traffic” alert but in practice this 
number varies from  20-100 times. 
 Table 4 shows the results of varying the number of 
repeated alerts in a single DosAttack instance. 
Table 4. Results for various alert repeat factors 
for Attack 4 
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6
TCP-SCAN 
(Optional)
1 1 1 1 1 1 
BAD TRAFFIC 
0 ttl 
1 1 1 1 10 90 
BAD TRAFFIC 
loopback traffic 
1 2 3 68 1 1 
# of expected 
matches 
67 33 22 0 67 54 
# of actual 
matches 
66 32 21 0 65 44 
The results indicate that the number of signature 
matches in this case is largely dependent upon the “BAD 
Traffic loopback traffic” alert. When the repeat factor for 
this particular alert is increased the overall number of 
signature matches is reduced. The high values for the 
“BAD TRAFFIC 0 ttl” alert repeat factor indicate that 
there are large numbers of this particular alert being 
generated. The administrator is able to tune the desired 
number of alerts of a particular type required in order for 
the signature to match thus allowing the number of times a 
signature fires to be reduced.   
5.2.3. Signature Priority Signature priority comes into 
play when two signatures are awaiting the arrival of the 
same alert. Examples are our signatures for Attacks 1 and 
2, which both utilise the alert “SCAN Proxy (8080)”, and 
Attacks 2 and 3, which both utilise the “RPC portmap 
listing” alert. When the attacks were run sequentially, 
Attack 2 was successfully detected.  However, during the 
simultaneous attack runs, the Attack 2 signatures were 
denied access to mandatory alert components. This is 
because the required alerts were consumed by higher 
priority signatures, namely those for Attacks 1 and 3. This 
illustrates the importance of selecting suitable priority 
values, especially when using our “single-fit” strategy. 
This scenario could be avoided (possibly at the expense 
of larger numbers of false-positive matchings) by 
employing a “multiple-fit” strategy. Further research is 
required to analyse these issues in greater detail. It should 
be noted that, as expected, we were able to cause the 
signature for Attack 2 to match by giving it a higher 
priority that those for Attacks 1 and 3. Of course, in this 
instance the matching of Attacks 1 and 3 is inhibited.  
5.2.4. IP Mask A limitation of the test network meant that 
the specification of an IP mask in the signatures could not 
be tested. For this reason we were not able to perform any 
experiments using the IP mask signature component. For 
the purposes of illustration we show how the IP mask may 
be useful for signatures when detecting Attack 4. A denial 
of service attack may be directed at a range of addresses 
on the victim network, impacting availability of the entire 
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network. By specifying a suitable IP mask in the signature, 
rather than a single target address, the effectiveness of the 
signature can be improved since a single signature can 
accumulate alerts generated for multiple target hosts. 
6. Conclusions and Future Work  
Our results to date have demonstrated a viable 
signature-based attack detection scheme that utilises 
commodity components. The signature structure which we 
propose is sufficiently flexible to detect a variety of 
complex attack scenarios. Through practical 
experimentation with the signature constraints, including 
mandatory/optional components with weighting, alert 
repeat factors and signature priorities it has been shown 
that this approach allows for the specification of accurate, 
yet fault-tolerant, signatures. The system we have 
developed was not intended for real-time analysis of alerts. 
Instead it has proven to be a useful test-bed for the 
development of complex attack signatures through 
experimentation with the various signature parameters in 
an off-line environment.  
The results are preliminary and more comprehensive 
testing is needed using a wide range of multi-step attacks, 
with alert information from both HIDS and NIDS, in order 
to establish performance with respect to error rates and to 
more firmly establish that the signature specification 
notation we have developed is sufficiently expressive. 
The signature notation we have developed promises to 
be useful for alert aggregation and reduction. In particular, 
the alert repeat factor acts as a tool for alert reduction (via 
aggregation). More experiments must be conducted to 
fully explore the benefits of this approach for reducing the 
overall number of alerts generated by the system.  
A multiple-fit signature-matching algorithm is currently 
being investigated. Multiple-fit needs to incorporate 
multiple simultaneous alert-matching threads in order to 
maintain concurrent matching in situations where alerts 
match multiple attack signatures. In this way an alert will 
potentially be matched to multiple signatures. In simplistic 
terms, this concurrent matching will then fire when the 
first contributing signature is completely matched, 
followed by rollback with respect to the other contributors, 
although this too presents issues with respect to relative 
priorities (severity) of the competing potentially matching 
signatures.   
Finally, further work is needed with respect to 
visualization to assist in analysing alerts and developing 
attack signatures. Additional features that have been 
identified for inclusion in the alert graphic tool to date are:  
 graphing with and without the alerts 
attributable to signatures,  
 graphing of the alerts only attributable to 
signatures, and  
 the specific graphing of items such as pre-
defined clusters.  
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